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ABSTRACT—Disability insurance policies generally provide benefits to
workers who are unable to work because they become addicted to drugs or
alcohol. But what happens when the addict stops the substance abuse?
Addiction is considered to be a lifelong disease with no real cure. Many
addicts fear that a return to the workplace will trigger a relapse into
substance abuse, for example when an anesthesiologist returns to work
after becoming addicted to an anesthetic drug. This Note examines whether
the risk of relapsing into substance abuse can ever qualify as a disability
under conventional own-occupation group disability policies, which are
subject to ERISA. Although courts have readily held that risks of physical
harm, such as a heart attack, can constitute a disability because they render
a policyholder unable to work, courts have thus far split when it comes to a
risk of relapse into substance abuse. This Note argues that a risk of relapse
into substance abuse can sometimes constitute a disability because there is
no meaningful legal distinction between that and a risk of physical injury.
To determine when these risks of future harm constitute a current
disability, courts and ERISA plan administrators should assess whether the
risk faced by the policyholder would prevent a reasonable person without
disability insurance—and thus no reason to falsely claim an inability to
work—from returning to employment.
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INTRODUCTION
For sixteen years, Dr. Julie Colby was a successful anesthesiologist in
Massachusetts and a partner in her medical practice.1 But in July 2004,
Colby was found unconscious in the hospital by a coworker.2 This was the
first sign that she had become addicted to Fentanyl, an extremely strong—
approximately 100 times more potent than morphine3—and very addictive
opioid that Colby administered as an anesthesiologist. She had been
diverting Fentanyl from patients for her own use for quite some time.4
Colby left her job and enrolled in a substance abuse treatment facility
in Georgia in August 2004.5 There, Colby was diagnosed not only with
Fentanyl dependence, but also with chronic depression, mild obsessivecompulsive disorder, and a degenerative disc disease that caused her severe
back pain.6 She remained in treatment at the facility in Georgia until
November 2004 and remained under supervision on an outpatient basis

1

Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co. & Mgmt. Co. for Merrimack Anesthesia Assocs. Long Term
Disability Plan (Colby II), 705 F.3d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 2013).
2
Id.
3
DRUG & CHEM. EVALUATION SECTION, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., FENTANYL (2013),
available at http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drug_chem_info/fentanyl.pdf.
4
Colby II, 705 F.3d at 60.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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thereafter.7 In 2005, her medical license was revoked.8 Soon after that,
Colby experienced a series of distressing life events, including the deaths
of her mother and mother-in-law and the death of her abusive ex-husband
from a heroin overdose. Unsurprisingly, these events only worsened her
depression.9 Nevertheless, all accounts suggest that Colby has not relapsed
in her use of Fentanyl since her addiction was first revealed.10
Though Colby’s addiction ended her ability to practice her profession,
she was fortunate to have disability insurance. Like many Americans,
Colby received disability coverage through her employer.11 Her policy was
own-occupation long-term disability insurance, which is quite common.12
Basically, the policy required the insurance company to pay her benefits if
an injury or illness prevented her from performing the material duties of
her regular occupation as a physician.13 After thirty-six months of paying
benefits, the insurance company could cease payment under the terms of
the contract unless Colby’s injury or sickness prevented her from
performing any “gainful occupation for which [her] education, training, and
experience qualifie[d her].”14
Colby’s insurance company agreed to pay benefits during Colby’s stay
in the treatment facility, as the policy’s definition of disability clearly
included addiction.15 But when Colby left the treatment program, the
insurer ceased payment of benefits.16 Though she was no longer using
Fentanyl, Colby argued that she was disabled under the terms of the policy
because a return to work as a physician, specifically in her field of
anesthesiology, would lead to a significant risk of relapse.17 In short, she
claimed that her history of addiction constituted a disability that prevented
her from returning to an occupation where she would be surrounded by
7

Id.
Brief of Appellant Union Security Insurance Co. at 5, Colby II, 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013) (No.
11-2270), 2012 WL 605506, at *5.
9
Colby II, 705 F.3d at 63 & n.8.
10
Id. at 60.
11
Michelle Andrews, Employers Increasingly Trimming or Cutting Disability Benefits, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/features/insuring-your-health/
michelle-andrews-on-disability-coverage.aspx.
12
See 3 INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 11:34 (6th ed. 2013).
13
Colby II, 705 F.3d at 62. A second condition required Colby to “be under the regular care and
attendance of a doctor.” Id.
14
See Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 818 F. Supp. 2d 365, 384 (D. Mass. 2011).
15
Colby II, 705 F.3d at 60–62.
16
Id. at 60.
17
Id. at 62–63. Even if Colby wanted to return to practice, she would not have been allowed to
because her license had been revoked. This is called a “legal disability,” which is not covered under
most disability insurance policies. See Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 603 F. Supp. 2d 223, 245 (D.
Mass. 2009). The existence of a “legal disability, however, does not negate a health-related disability on
which such legal detriment is based.” Hannagan v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-795
(FJS/DEP), 2010 WL 1235395, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010).
8
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Fentanyl. The insurer disagreed, stating that a “risk for relapse is not the
same as a current disability.”18
After unsuccessfully pursuing administrative remedies, Colby filed
suit in federal district court in Massachusetts, arguing that the denial of
benefits was arbitrary and capricious.19 Colby faced an uphill battle; most
of the courts that had addressed the question of whether a risk of relapse
into substance abuse could constitute a current disability had ruled that it
could not,20 including the only circuit court that had ruled on the matter at
that point—the Fourth Circuit, in Stanford v. Continental Casualty Co.21
Luckily for Colby, the First Circuit disagreed with those other courts,
holding that her risk of relapse into substance abuse upon a return to work
was so high that it constituted a current disability under her policy.22
In so ruling, the First Circuit created a circuit split significant not only
to those that struggle with substance abuse but also to any person who is on
the margin of qualifying for disability benefits. This Note will examine
whether the risk of relapsing into substance abuse can ever qualify as a
disability under a conventional own-occupation group disability policy and,
if it can, what type of evidence should be required to show a current
disability. Employers provide own-occupation group disability policies, so
they are regulated by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA).23 Because these plans are regulated on a national
scale, there must be a single national answer to this question.
Though this question is narrow, it requires a much broader analysis of
what the term “disability” means in such a policy. The policies themselves
define disability as an injury or sickness that leaves the insured unable to
perform the material duties of her own occupation.24 This definition leaves
many questions unanswered, chief among them: when is a sick or injured
person truly “unable to perform the material duties” of a job? Does the
definition require physical inability—a broken arm that leaves a firefighter
unable to carry a hose? Such a narrow definition would deny coverage to a
worker who could physically perform the tasks of a job but would face a
dire threat of a heart attack from performing them; it would also exclude
the mentally ill. In contrast, an overly broad definition that provided
coverage for anyone remotely afraid that his job could cause him injury
18

Colby II, 705 F.3d at 60.
See id. at 60–61.
20
See, e.g., Forste v. Paul Revere Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 1:02-CV-1584 RLY TAB, 2004
WL 3315386, at *12 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 2004); Allen v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1377,
1383–84 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (state law non-ERISA case); Laucks v. Provident Cos., No. 1CV971507,
1999 WL 33320463, at *4–6 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 1999).
21
514 F.3d 354, 358–60 (4th Cir. 2008).
22
Colby II, 705 F.3d at 66.
23
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, and
42 U.S.C.).
24
See, e.g., Colby II, 705 F.3d at 62.
19
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could lead people to take advantage of the system by applying for benefits
instead of working.
To date, courts have not established a coherent test to determine
whether or not a particular risk of future injury constitutes a current
disability. Although courts have readily found that a significant risk of
future physical injury—such as a heart attack—may constitute a current
disability,25 most courts have refused to so characterize a risk of relapse
into substance abuse. Yet, these same courts have done little to distinguish
between the risks of future physical injury and substance abuse relapse.
This Note lays out a framework that courts—and ERISA plan
administrators—can use to determine whether a risk of future injury
constitutes a current disability. Courts should ask whether the risk faced
would prevent a reasonable person without disability insurance from
returning to work. Starting from the notion that some risks, such as a very
high risk of a heart attack, clearly rise to the level of current disability,
while others, such as the risk of contracting the common cold from a
coworker, do not, this framework will draw a line between these two
extremes of potential future injury. This test will focus on the quantitative
likelihood that a relapse will occur upon a return to work, as well as the
qualitative severity of the possible harm. Additionally, this Note analyzes
the possibly perverse incentives facing someone with a risk of relapse into
substance abuse, as well as concerns such as moral hazard, adverse
selection, and the goals of disability insurance. Finally, this Note examines
the most convincing distinction that has been made between physical
relapse and relapse into substance abuse: that a person can relapse into
substance abuse only if they “choose” to resume abuse.
Using this framework, this Note argues that the risk of relapsing into
substance abuse can rise to the level of current disability because there is
no meaningful legal distinction between it and a risk of physical injury.
This Note focuses on a specific type of relapse risk in order to demonstrate
the way in which the framework functions: the risk that an anesthesiologist
will relapse into an opioid26 addiction. This example is chosen both because
such abuse is shockingly common27 and because it has been the context of
25

See, e.g., Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381, 383 (3d Cir. 2003).
The term “opioid” is distinct from the more common “opiate.” An opiate is a substance derived
from the opium poppy plant, such as heroin, morphine, and codeine. The term opioid includes all
opiates, as well as synthetic and semisynthetic substances that affect the brain in the same manner as
opiates. Synthetic and semisynthetic opioids include fentanyl and oxycodone. See MICHAEL G. BISSEL
& MICHAEL A. PEAT, Opioids 1: Opiates, in CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY TESTING: A GUIDE FOR
LABORATORY PROFESSIONALS 140, 140 (Barbarajean Magnani et al. eds., 2012).
27
Substance abuse has been called an “occupational hazard of being a physician, especially for
anesthesiologists.” TASK FORCE ON CHEM. DEPENDENCE, AM. SOC’Y OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, MODEL
CURRICULUM ON DRUG ABUSE AND ADDICTION FOR RESIDENTS IN ANESTHESIOLOGY, available at
http://www.asahq.org/For-Members/Quality-and-Regulatory-Affairs/Practice-ManagementPublications/~/media/E64BA6191C474DD5946981FDF8DF501D.ashx. For example, in a 1987 study,
26
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many cases dealing with the risk of relapse into substance abuse.28 The
statistical likelihood of such a relapse and the consequences of relapse are
often so severe as to truly bar a person from performing the material duties
of her occupation. Furthermore, there are no convincing policy reasons that
the risk of relapse into substance abuse should be barred as a disability.
Finally, the idea that a person can only relapse into substance abuse after a
choice to do so is overly simplistic and should not be a bar to benefit
payments.
This Note begins in Part I by reviewing the structure of insurance law,
the language and typology of disability insurance policies, and the case law
concerning risks of relapse for both physical illness and substance abuse.
Part II develops a framework for analyzing whether a risk of future injury
should constitute a current disability. In Part III, this framework is applied
to risks of relapse into substance abuse, with a special focus on opioid
addiction among anesthesiologists. This Note concludes that risk of
substance abuse relapse can in some circumstances be considered a current
disability for purposes of own-occupation group disability insurance plans.
I. DISABILITY INSURANCE LAW AND THE RISK OF RELAPSE
Insurance law in America is governed by a convoluted regulatory
structure. Largely through historical accident,29 insurance is primarily
regulated by the states; though state insurance regulation is quite similar
from state to state, the existence of fifty different regulatory regimes makes
it difficult to generalize in the realm of insurance law.30 Insurance provided
through an employer, however, is also governed by ERISA, a federal
statute that sometimes preempts state insurance laws.31 This Note avoids
disparities in state laws by focusing mainly on ERISA-covered disability
policies. Thus, a single legal standard can apply. Another problem with
anesthesiologists made up 12% of physician admissions into drug treatment programs, though they
constituted only 4% of physicians in the United States. E. Laura Wright et al., Opioid Abuse Among
Nurse Anesthetists and Anesthesiologists, 80 AM. ASS’N NURSE ANESTHETISTS J. 120, 120 (2012).
Opioids, especially Fentanyl and Sufentanil, are the “drug[s] of choice” for anesthesiologist addicts.
Ethan O. Bryson & Jeffrey H. Silverstein, Addiction and Substance Abuse in Anesthesiology,
109 ANESTHESIOLOGY 905, 905 (2008). The possible reasons for this high rate of opioid abuse are
discussed in Bryson & Silverstein, supra.
28
See, e.g., Colby II, 705 F.3d at 60; Stanford v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 355 (4th Cir.
2008); Hellman v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1045–46 (M.D. Tenn. 2001);
Brosnan v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 460, 461 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Holzer v.
MBL Life Assurance Corp., No. 97 Civ. 5834(TPG), 1999 WL 649004, at *1, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25,
1999).
29
David A. Skeel, Jr., The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation,
76 TEX. L. REV. 723, 731 n.27 (1998).
30
Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 629 (1999).
31
Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: State Regulation of Insured Plans After Davila, 38 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 693, 695–96 (2005).
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generalizing in this realm is that insurance law is at its core based on
contract interpretation, making the precise language of a policy vitally
important. Thankfully, the policies involved in risk-of-relapse cases contain
language that is functionally identical, allowing for generalization across
many policies.32
A. The Basic Structure of Insurance Law and ERISA
Insurance in the United States is primarily regulated through the states,
mostly because insurance was considered to be legally beyond the reach of
congressional action for many years. In Paul v. Virginia, an 1869 case, the
Supreme Court ruled that Congress could not regulate insurance via its
Commerce Clause power because “[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a
transaction of commerce.”33 This decision prompted the states to develop
their own legal regimes for the regulation of insurance law.34 However, in
1944 the Court reversed itself, coming to the logical conclusion in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n that insurance is indeed
commerce.35 Though this opened the door for Congress to displace the
states in insurance regulation, Congress largely declined to exercise this
option, mostly because insurance companies by this point favored state
regulation.36 Instead, Congress passed the McCarran–Ferguson Act in 1945,
which mandated that insurance would be regulated by the states and that no
act of Congress would be construed to preempt a state insurance law unless
the federal statute specifically related to insurance.37
Although Congress has continued to allow states to be the primary
regulators of most types of insurance, a huge change occurred in health and
disability insurance regulation with the passage of ERISA in 1974. ERISA
federalized the regulation of employee benefits, with the initial primary
target being employee pension plans.38 At the last minute, however,
Congress expanded the law to include insurance benefits provided by
employers.39 This inclusion constituted a major shift in the insurance

32

See infra Part I.B.
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869).
34
See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 24 (2d ed. 2008).
35
322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).
36
See Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and Antitrust Law: The McCarran–Ferguson Act and Beyond,
25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 81, 85–86 (1983).
37
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012).
38
Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Savings Clause, § 502 Implied Preemption, Complete
Preemption, and State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 105–06 & n.3 (2001).
39
See ERISA: A Quarter Century of Providing Workers Health Insurance: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Emp’r–Emp. Relations of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 106th Cong. 13
(1999) (statement of Rand Rosenblatt, Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs,
Rutgers University Law School) (arguing that ERISA’s application to insurance was added as a lastminute change in the conference committee and passed without reasonable scrutiny by the democratic
33
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industry, as most health40 and disability insurance41 in the United States for
those under sixty-five is provided by employers.
The application of ERISA to insurance is quite complex and generally
has created many problems for those employees whom ERISA was created
to help. While ERISA in general must not “be construed to [preempt] any
law of any State which regulates insurance,”42 ERISA also declares,
“[n]either an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under such
a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company.”43 In essence, this
means that ERISA does preempt all state insurance laws when the
employer creates a trust into which it deposits money to pay employee
insurance claims.44 Many employee benefit plans follow this route.45
For the purposes of this Note, this preemption has two profound
effects on a group disability insurance claimant.46 First, benefit denials are
usually reviewed in federal rather than state court.47 Second, benefit denials
are often judged according to a deferential standard of review.48 In
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,49 the Supreme Court ruled that
judicial review of benefit denials under ERISA should use the abuse of
discretion standard if “the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe
the terms of the plan.”50 This is because ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty
derived from trust law on administrators of all employee benefit plans,51
and review of the decisions of trustees is governed by the abuse of

process, as the conference bill was passed without serious discussion of the significance of this
addition).
40
Elise Gould, 2010 Marks Another Year of Decline for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
Coverage, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.epi.org/publication/2010-marks-yeardecline-employer-sponsored.
41
Andrews, supra note 11.
42
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2012).
43
Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
44
BAKER, supra note 34, at 131.
45
Id. at 132.
46
It also has one profound effect not explored herein: members of any employer-sponsored health
or disability benefit plan, whether or not in trust form, are unable to collect punitive damages or tort
damages for wrongful death or personal injury. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52–57
(1987); see also Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 214–15 (2004) (invalidating Texas law that
sought to avoid this aspect of ERISA by providing a breach of contract remedy); Andrews-Clarke v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 55–56 (D. Mass. 1997) (criticizing this aspect of ERISA).
47
Sandra J. Weiland, ERISA’s Silence: Standards of Review in Deemed Denial Employment Benefit
Claims, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 613–15 (2005).
48
See, e.g., Colby II, 705 F.3d 58, 61 (1st Cir. 2013). Benefit approvals, of course, are never
challenged in court because the insurer itself is the party approving payment.
49
489 U.S. 101 (1989).
50
Id. at 115.
51
Id. at 110.

646

108:639 (2014)

Future Harm as a Current Disability

discretion standard.52 In ERISA cases, this standard is equivalent to the
familiar arbitrary and capricious standard.53
However, “trust law presupposes that the trustee . . . will be
disinterested, in the sense of having no personal stake in the trust assets.”54
Yet, in most instances, the administrator of an ERISA insurance plan is an
employee of the insurance company providing the benefits or is otherwise
aligned with the employer.55 The administrator therefore has a conflict of
interest created by a clear incentive to deny benefits: “[E]very dollar saved
by the administrator on behalf of his employer is a dollar in [the
employer]’s pocket.”56 Not only is the person evaluating claims the same
person that would have to pay approved benefits, but his decisions also
receive significant deference from courts.57 To counteract this conflict of
interests, courts have adopted “a sliding scale according to which the plan
administrator’s decision must be more objectively reasonable and
supported by more substantial evidence as the incentive for abuse of
discretion is shown to increase.”58 ERISA claimants, however, still face a
difficult battle in court, because “the existence of a conflict of interest is
only one factor to be considered in reviewing a denial of benefits for abuse
of discretion.”59
Finally, insurance law is, at its core, contract law.60 While ERISA
slightly modifies this arrangement for employment-based insurance,
contract law still provides the general guidelines for insurance policy
interpretation.61 One key doctrine of contract law that courts typically apply
to insurance contracts is contra proferentem (“against the drafter”), under
which a court will “interpret ambiguous insurance policies in favor of
policyholders.”62

52

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959).
Colby II, 705 F.3d at 61.
54
John H. Langbein, Essay, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The UNUM/Provident Scandal and
Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1326 (2007).
55
Id. at 1326–27.
56
Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 144 (3d Cir. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
57
For a thorough criticism of this arrangement, see Langbein, supra note 54, at 1327.
58
Stanford v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 357 (4th Cir. 2008); see, e.g., Fought v. UNUM Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1004 (10th Cir. 2004) (per curium) (discussing the sliding scale
approach).
59
Stanford, 514 F.3d at 357.
60
BAKER, supra note 34, at 29.
61
Id. at 30.
62
Id.; see also Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 601–03 (2d. Cir. 1947)
(Hand, J.) (applying the doctrine of contra proferentem).
53
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B. Disability Insurance Policies
The main goal of disability insurance is to protect the income of the
insured in the event that physical or mental illness interferes with the
insured’s ability to work.63 Another goal of disability insurance is the
rehabilitation of disabled claimants.64 Despite the importance of these
goals, and the fact that people are quite likely to become disabled in their
lifetime,65 “[d]isability insurance tends to be one of the more overlooked
forms of insurance,” with just under half of young American workers
covered by short-term disability insurance (coverage for less than two
years), and even fewer with long-term disability insurance.66
The main reasons for disability insurance’s relative unpopularity are
the twin concerns of moral hazard and adverse selection, which make the
price of an individual disability insurance policy quite high.67 Insurance
companies are willing to sell policies only at high prices because of the
concern that insured people will act in a way likely to lead to injury or will
fake an injury (moral hazard), or that only people who know they face a
high risk of injury will purchase disability insurance (adverse selection).
Another reason for low enrollment is that most Americans are entitled to
public disability benefits through Social Security, leading people to
discount the value of individual coverage.68 However, Social Security
provides benefits only to those who have an “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity.”69 Because most disabilities are not covered by
this strict definition, most workers who sustain an injury that prevents them
from continuing in their job will suffer a substantial income loss unless
they have personal coverage.70
The majority of disability insurance coverage is for “total disability.”71
Such coverage provides benefits when an illness or injury makes the
63

Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform:
Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 81 (1993).
64
See Stanford, 514 F.3d at 362 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); David M. Richards, Understanding
Today’s Disability Insurance Contracts, COLO. LAW., Mar. 2011, at 69, 71.
65
Policy Basics: Top Ten Facts About Social Security, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES
(Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3261 (“Of recent entrants to the
labor force, almost four in ten men (37 percent) and three in ten women (31 percent) will become
disabled or die before reaching the full retirement age.”).
66
Kimberly Palmer, Why You Probably Need More Disability Insurance, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 9,
2013), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/2013/10/09/why-you-probably-needmore-disability-insurance.
67
BAKER, supra note 34, at 177.
68
Social Security Basic Facts, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. (July 26, 2013), http://www.ssa.gov/
pressoffice/basicfact.htm (noting that approximately 91% of workers between twenty-one and sixtyfour years old that are in employment covered by Social Security are eligible for benefits if long-term
disability occurs).
69
42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1) (2006).
70
See Abraham & Liebman, supra note 63, at 84.
71
Id. at 81.
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policyholder unable to perform the major duties of either her own
occupation or any reasonable alternative occupation, depending on the type
of policy purchased.72 Some disability insurance plans also cover “partial
disability,” which provides benefits if the insured is unable to perform one
or more of the essential tasks of his or her (or any) occupation.73 Disability
plans can also be differentiated between individual plans and group plans—
those provided through an employer.
Roughly speaking, there are three different types of private total
disability insurance policies. First, and most common, is “ownoccupation”74 coverage, which provides benefits if the insured is unable to
perform the material duties of her specific occupation due to illness or
injury.75 The second type is “general disability” coverage, which pays
benefits only if injury or illness leaves the insured unable to perform the
material duties of any occupation.76 Some general disability policies are
more lenient, requiring an inability to work in any occupation for “which
[the insured’s] education, training, and experience qualifies [the insured].”77
The third type is a “hybrid” policy, in which a period of own-occupation
coverage is followed by a longer period of general disability coverage.78
Own-occupation coverage is the most expensive of the three because it
is the broadest; any injury that causes inability to perform the insured’s
own work will constitute a disability, even if the insured is able to do
countless other jobs. Additionally, it is very prone to moral hazard because
claimants have no incentive to return to the workforce in an otherwise
equal or lesser paying occupation. That is the reason for hybrid policies.
This Note is primarily concerned with group total own-occupation
disability policies for several reasons. First, group policies are covered by
ERISA,79 making it easier to compare cases and develop a legal standard.
Group policies are also much more common than individual ones.80
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See 10A COUCH ON INSURANCE § 147:2 (3d ed. 2012).
Id. § 147:7; see also AM. COUNCIL ON LIFE INSURERS, DISABILITY INCOME INSURANCE:
FINANCIAL PROTECTION FOR YOU AND YOUR FAMILY 4 (2007). Partial disability coverage is rare and
quite expensive due to the significant moral hazard implications of allowing an insured to continue
working, yet also apply for benefits based on a supposed inability to perform certain work-related tasks.
See Abraham & Liebman, supra note 63, at 110–11.
74
See, e.g., 17 FLORIDA INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 38:4 (2013–2014 ed. 2013).
75
COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 72, § 147:107.
76
See id. § 147:40.
77
Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 818 F. Supp. 2d 365, 384 (D. Mass. 2011).
78
COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 72, § 147:107.
79
See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 43, 57 (1987).
80
See David J. Christianson, Disability Income Insurance: The Private Market and the Impact of
Genetic Testing, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 40, 41–42 (Supp. 2007). Group policies are less expensive
because they alleviate adverse selection problems. See Karl Kronebusch, Medicaid and the Politics of
Groups: Recipients, Providers, and Policy Making, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 839, 856 (1997).
Similar to an insurance mandate, group insurance that covers all workers broadens the risk pool by
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Second, total disability coverage is more common than partial disability
insurance,81 is implicated in more of the case law considered herein, and is
a much more clear-cut issue in terms of coverage: the insured is either
entitled to benefits or is not—there is no added difficulty of determining
the amount of benefits to which the insured is entitled. Finally, only ownoccupation policies are considered because former addicts will almost
always be able to perform the material duties of some occupation, even if a
risk of relapse does not allow them to return to their former occupation.82
Though the definition of “disability” in insurance policies can differ in
many ways, the substance of coverage is materially the same among almost
all group total own-occupation disability policies. Disagreements in the
case law regarding the risk of relapse do not seem to stem from differences
in policy language but rather from more fundamental notions of what this
type of policy is meant to cover. Thus, it is possible for the purposes of this
Note to generalize across the policies at issue in the case law and define a
“disability” as “injury or sickness caus[ing] physical or mental impairment
to such a degree of severity that [the insured is] . . . continuously unable to
perform the material and substantial duties of [the insured’s] regular
occupation.”83 Basically, this definition requires the insurer to pay benefits
when the insured is unable to return to work because of injury or sickness.
C. Judicial Decisions Regarding the Risk of Relapse
Courts have a mixed record when considering cases in which there is a
risk of physical or mental illness associated with return to work. When
analyzing these cases it is important to remember the more lenient standard
of review that applies to benefit denials made by ERISA plan
administrators.84 In most ERISA cases, the reviewing court may overturn a
benefit denial only if it is deemed to be arbitrary and capricious, meaning
that there was no reasonable basis for the decision.
It is settled law that the risk of relapse of a physical disease can
constitute a disability.85 The leading case for this proposition, which the
Stanford86 and Colby87 courts both cited approvingly, is the Third Circuit

including those with both a high and low risk of loss purchase insurance. See Brendan S. Maher, The
Benefits of Opt-In Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1770–74 (2011).
81
See Abraham & Liebman, supra note 63.
82
See Colby II, 705 F.3d 58, 62–63 (1st Cir. 2013).
83
Stanford v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 358 (4th Cir. 2008) (some alterations in original).
84
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
85
See 31 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 187.05[A], at 214 (2d ed. 2007)
(“The insured is considered to be permanently and totally disabled when it is impossible to work
without hazarding his or her health or risking his or her life.”).
86
514 F.3d at 358.
87
705 F.3d. at 66.
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case Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.88 The plaintiff in
Lasser was a surgeon with an ERISA-regulated, own-occupation disability
group policy which not only covered complete inability to work but also
provided benefits if a disability allowed the policyholder to perform only
some of the material duties of his occupation.89 After suffering a heart
attack, the plaintiff followed his doctor’s orders to decrease his stress level
by reducing his patient load by half, and ceasing to perform emergency
surgery and being “on-call” at night and on weekends.90 Though the insurer
initially provided disability benefits, it then terminated his benefits on the
ground that he was not disabled.91
The Third Circuit held that the benefit denial was arbitrary and
capricious.92 The majority quickly dispensed with the idea that the risk of
future injury is insufficient to constitute a current disability, stating,
“[W]hether risk of future effects creates a present disability depends on the
probability of the future risk’s occurrence.”93 The dissent conceded the
possibility that a risk of relapse could be a current disability, but argued
that a policyholder should have to quantify this risk in order to be granted
benefits.94 The majority disagreed, stating that it would be too difficult for a
plaintiff to provide evidence of statistical risk. Thus, the majority accepted
numerous doctors’ qualitative reports stating that the plaintiff’s risk of
future injury was high—claims not convincingly refuted by the insurer—as
sufficient and awarded the plaintiff benefits.95 Other courts have similarly
held that a risk of a heart attack can constitute a current disability.96
While risk of relapse of a physical disease is accepted as a disability,
courts differ sharply on whether risk of relapse into substance abuse can be
a disability. Although only two circuits have considered the issue, many
federal district courts have analyzed these claims. About half of these
courts held that risk of substance abuse relapse can never constitute a
current disability.97 The other half held that risk of relapse can constitute a
88

344 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 383–84.
90
Id. at 383.
91
Id. at 384.
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Id. at 383.
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Id. at 391 n.12.
94
Id. at 397 (Garth, J., dissenting).
95
Id. at 391 (majority opinion).
96
See, e.g., Kent v. Provident Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 146 F. App’x 862, 864 (9th Cir. 2005); Napoli
v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co., 78 F. App’x 787, 789 (2d Cir. 2003); Saliamonas v. CNA, Inc., 127 F.
Supp. 2d 997, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Buffaloe v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 5:99-CV-710BR(3), 2000 WL 33951195, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 8, 2000).
97
See, e.g., Forste v. Paul Revere Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 1:02-CV-1584 RLY TAB, 2004
WL 3315386, at *12 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 2004); Allen v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1377,
1383–84 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (state law non-ERISA case); Laucks v. Provident Cos., No. 1CV971507,
1999 WL 33320463, at *4–6 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 1999).
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present disability, though one of these courts held that the plaintiff at bar
had not shown sufficient evidence that he was in fact likely to relapse to
survive a motion for judgment on the administrative record.98 The others
found either that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the risk was
high enough,99 that the denial was arbitrary and capricious in light of the
evidence,100 or, under de novo review, that the policy covered risk of
relapse.101
A circuit court took up this issue for the first time in Stanford v.
Continental Casualty Co.102 The plaintiff, a nurse anesthetist, became
addicted to Fentanyl.103 After successfully completing an addiction
treatment program, he quickly relapsed.104 The plaintiff returned to his job
the following year after completing another addiction treatment program
but again relapsed when he began taking Fentanyl at work.105 Yet again, he
completed an addiction rehabilitation program and this time did not relapse.
His insurer, which had paid him benefits during treatment, terminated those
benefits in January 2005 after he had completed his treatment program,
after being informed by a registered nurse consultant that the plaintiff “no
longer suffered any impairment that would prevent him from performing
the duties of his occupation.”106 The plaintiff sought administrative review
of the denial, claiming that he remained at risk for a relapse if he returned
to work. The insurer denied his appeal, stating that, “the policy does not
cover potential risk.”107
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the insurance company’s claim that a
risk of relapse into addiction could never constitute a present disability.108
98

See Price v. Disability RMS, No. 06-10251-GAO, 2008 WL 763255, at *21–22 (D. Mass. Mar.
21, 2008). “A motion for a judgment on the record in an ERISA case, although similar to an ordinary
summary judgment motion, differs in that the non-moving party is not entitled to the usual inferences in
its favor.” Id. at *1 (quoting Orndorf v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 510, 517 (1st Cir. 2005))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
99
See, e.g., Hamilton v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 2:07-cv-00944-MCE-DAD, 2010 WL
315025, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2010); Hellman v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1044,
1049–50 (M.D. Tenn. 2001); Holzer v. MBL Life Assurance Corp., No. 97 Civ. 5834(TPG), 1999 WL
649004, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1999); Brosnan v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 31 F. Supp.
2d 460, 464–65 (E.D. Pa. 1998); see also Berry v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 385, 395–96
(La. Ct. App. 2009) (holding under state law that whether risk of relapse into substance abuse
constituted a current disability is a genuine issue of material fact).
100
See, e.g., Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 785, 797 (W.D. Mich. 2009).
101
Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, No. 98 C 50422, 2001 WL 1110489, at *4, *7 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 20, 2001).
102
514 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2008).
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Id. at 355.
104
Id. at 356.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 358, 360.
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The court held that the plaintiff was “not physically disabled or mentally
impaired . . . [and] is physically and mentally capable of performing [the]
job [of a nurse anesthetist].”109 The court’s analysis focused on
differentiating this type of risk from the risk of future physical illness:
[T]he risk of a heart attack is different from the risk of relapse into drug use. A
doctor with a heart condition who enters a high-stress environment like an
operating room “risks relapse” in the sense that the performance of his job
duties may cause a heart attack. But an anesthetist with a drug addiction who
enters an environment where drugs are readily available “risks relapse” only
in the sense that the ready availability of drugs increases his temptation to
resume his drug use. Whether he succumbs to that temptation remains his
choice; the heart-attack prone doctor has no such choice.110

Though asserting that it “[did] not mean to suggest that it is easy to
overcome an addict’s temptation,” the court found that “the availability of
this choice . . . distinguishes” these types of risks of relapse from
completely choiceless relapses like heart attacks.111
The court further stated that the split among lower court decisions
regarding the risk of relapse into addiction was proof that reasonable minds
can disagree over whether this risk constitutes a current disability.
Therefore, the insurer’s conclusion could not be considered unreasonable.112
Finally, the court addressed the contention that its decision created a
perverse incentive structure in which an addict who continues to abuse
drugs would continue to receive benefits but would lose those benefits
upon becoming sober. The court dismissed this argument because it
“operates on a false assumption, namely that disability benefits are a sort of
reward for sobriety. In fact, sobriety’s reward is the creation of
innumerable opportunities that were closed to [the plaintiff] as long as he
continued to use drugs,” even if these new opportunities do not include
returning to his previous job.113
Judge Wilkinson wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion. He argued that
coverage for risk of relapse was plainly called for under the terms of the
policy and that the majority had created an unwritten exception to the
coverage. Interpreting the contractual language, “[a]ll agree that [the
plaintiff] cannot presently return to work in safety, and if we ask why not,
the answer must be some existing, not future, impairment.”114 Wilkinson
pointed out that “potential risk,” which the insurer claimed the policy did
not cover, is redundant: “‘potential risk’ is just risk.”115 The insurer may
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 359.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 358 n.4.
Id. at 359.
Id.
Id. at 362 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 361.
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have meant that the policy does not cover risks of relapse, but such an
interpretation would not allow coverage for an increased risk of a heart
attack. Because that type of risk is undisputedly covered by the policy, so
must a risk of relapse into addiction, as mental and physical disorders are
treated equally under the plan.116 The dissent also noted the perverse
incentive inherent to the majority’s holding, arguing that requiring the
claimant “to relapse into addiction or lose his benefits would also thwart
the very purpose for which disability plans exist: to help people overcome
medical adversity if possible, and otherwise to cope with it.”117 Finally,
Wilkinson took issue with the majority’s contention that the presence of a
choice differentiated risks of physical and addictive relapse, arguing that
this was “legally ungrounded” and “appears to rest on moral considerations
of choice and temptation on the one hand, and medical considerations of
physical inability on the other, neither of which are to be found in the
language of a Plan that puts addiction squarely on all fours with other
impairments.”118
The only other circuit court to address this question was the First
Circuit in Colby v. Union Security Insurance Co. & Management Co. for
Merrimack Anesthesia Associates Long Term Disability Plan.119 The First
Circuit overturned Union Security’s denial of benefits to Dr. Colby as
arbitrary and capricious, explicitly agreeing with Judge Wilkinson’s
reasoning.120 Not only did the First Circuit rule that the risk of relapse into
addiction could constitute a current disability, it also held that the
overwhelming evidence in this instance could not support a denial of
benefits.121 The court found, “[G]iven the language of the plan,
categorically excluding risk of relapse as a source of disability is simply
unreasonable.”122 Given her history of abuse and physician testimony that
she was likely to relapse upon a return to anesthesiology, Colby was clearly
unable to perform the duties of her occupation, and there was no exclusion
in the policy that exempted such a disability from coverage.123 Moreover,
the majority stated, there is no way to create a principled distinction
between a risk of physical relapse and a risk of relapse into addiction. In
either circumstance, the insured may be physically able to perform the
116

Id. at 363.
Id. at 362.
118
Id. at 363.
119
Colby II, 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013).
120
Id. at 66–67. For the factual background of this case, see supra Part I.
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Id. at 65–66, 68. The district court had previously remanded this case to the insurance
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its position, maintaining that risk of relapse could never constitute a disability. Id. at 61. Without this
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Id. at 65.
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functions of his or her occupation; nevertheless the “risk of relapse is
prohibitively impairing and thus becomes, for all practical purposes, a
current disability.”124 The court did not discuss the possible distinction
caused by one’s “choice” to relapse into addiction.
II. RISK OF FUTURE INJURY AS A CURRENT DISABILITY
Currently, the courts lack a coherent way of analyzing whether a risk
of future injury from employment constitutes a current disability. This
leads to outcomes that are inconsistent across courts and also to arbitrary
and illogical line drawing between different factual circumstances. In part,
this is caused by the contractual nature of disability insurance as well as the
deference given to ERISA plan administrators.125 Courts are understandably
reluctant to define the meaning of terms or phrases across all contractual
agreements because context is key in deciding the meaning that parties
wish to attach to specific language. Furthermore, the deferential nature of
ERISA review requires judges to uphold reasonable interpretations of
policy language.
Yet there are several good reasons for courts to develop a more
coherent way of analyzing these types of claims. Although courts generally
do not define specific words across contracts, they sometimes develop
doctrines giving certain phrases a specified legal effect, and as a general
rule try to construe contracts that are similar in the same way.126 In the
disability insurance context, the definition of disability is substantially
identical across almost every policy.127 This fact, combined with the large
number of these cases that courts review, makes the development of a
framework of analysis a feasible and necessary task in order to avoid
inequitable inconsistency. Moreover, deference to administrative decisions
does not require courts to completely relinquish any role in determining
what should be covered under a given insurance policy. The framework
developed here is not intended to help judges determine whether a benefit
denial was correct; rather, it will guide judges in their proper role of
analyzing whether an administrator’s decision was reasonable.
A. Should a Risk of Future Injury Ever Be a Current Disability?
As with any question of insurance coverage, analysis must begin with
the policy language. In an occupational disability policy, the insured is
considered disabled if an injury or illness prevents her from performing the
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Id. at 66.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Under California contract
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material duties of her occupation.128 Thus, a risk of future injury is a
disability only if the risk functionally prevents the insured from working.
Insurance policies are structured to provide benefits only if a certain
event happens.129 But it is clear that insurers do not provide benefits simply
because there is a risk that something will happen. Insurance companies
have used this latter point as an argument against providing benefits for
risk of relapse, stating that their policies do not cover “potential risk.”130 In
his Stanford dissent, Judge Wilkinson pointed out that this phrase is
redundant.131 Although he is literally correct, he is conceptually mistaken.
Insurance is all about risk. A policy pays out if a specified event happens;
the risk is simply the probability that this event happens.132 Insurance
companies are correct to point out that they do not have to pay for a
“potential risk” and do not have to pay even if the likelihood of an event
rises substantially. However, this does not necessarily foreclose coverage
for risk of future injury under a disability policy, because an increase in the
likelihood of future injury can itself constitute an event—a disability—that
prevents the policyholder from returning to work. The difficulty comes in
distinguishing an increase in risk that simply makes a future disability more
likely from one that is in and of itself a disability.
A framework for analyzing this question must start with the somewhat
controversial assumption that a risk of future injury can ever constitute a
current disability. Insurers have argued that it cannot because this risk does
not prevent someone from physically performing the duties of her
occupation, but courts that have considered the question have correctly
rejected such a narrow conception of disability.133
The primary support for this assumption is the fact that multiple courts
have explicitly held that risk of future injury can constitute a current
disability, usually in the context of a risk of heart attack.134 These courts
seem intuitively correct—few would argue that someone is able to perform
the material duties of her profession if a return to work would entail a large
chance of death. It is blackletter law that disability coverage applies where
a person is able to perform the physical tasks of a job, but doing so would
put them at unacceptable risk because of their physical condition.135

128

See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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Because mental illness is covered under disability policies just as much as
physical illness,136 a risk of relapse should be similarly covered.
Coverage for risk of future injury is also supported by the fact that a
risk of future harm is often accepted as a form of current injury in another
area of the law—tort law. Three tort causes of action all use the idea of
“probabilistic injuries” as a basis for recovery.137 “Loss of chance” is a
cause of action that allows recovery for medical malpractice that affects a
patient’s likelihood of survival.138 “Increased risk of disease” is a tort that
allows recovery for exposure to toxic substances that causes an increased
risk of future disease—even if no symptoms are currently present and
injury is not certain.139 A similar cause of action exists for fear of future
disease from exposure to toxic substances.140 Although a majority of courts
require the risk of future injury to rise above 50% before it is compensable,
some have allowed for partial recovery where the risk is still below 50%.141
These causes of action and courts’ treatment of them show that courts are
willing to accept future risks as current injuries in the context of tort law.
B. Reasonable Non-insured Person Test
Although some risks of future injury can constitute a current disability,
most cannot. Everyone is at some risk for every kind of disability. Just by
going into work every day, people expose themselves to the possibility of
countless injuries: car crashes during the commute, exposure to
communicable diseases from coworkers, and physical injuries inherent to
job duties. Yet few people would argue that these risks, which could be
avoided by staying at home in bed, constitute a disability; they do not
prevent a person from performing the duties of her occupation. These risks
are the reason that people purchase disability insurance, not the basis for
benefits. On the other hand, most people would concede that a person truly
is unable to perform the duties of his occupation if his risk of a severe heart
136

See Abraham & Liebman, supra note 63; see also, e.g., Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 603
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attack would rise from 40% to 90% upon returning to work after recovering
from a first heart attack.
The best way to understand the difference between these situations is
that in the case of minor job-associated risks, a reasonable person would,
absent the availability of disability payments, decide to continue working.
In contrast, a reasonable person would not continue working if the work
would likely lead to a heart attack, even if the person had no disability
insurance. This inquiry into reasonableness is what insurers, as well as
reviewing judges, should use to determine whether a risk of future injury
constitutes a current disability.
There are three main reasons that insurers and courts should use this
reasonable insured test. First, it is the best way to faithfully implement the
language in disability policies. Assessing coverage under these policies
requires a determination of whether the claimant is able to perform the
material duties of her occupation. How better to answer this question than
by inquiring whether a reasonable person could perform those duties? A
subjective test would be unworkable because it is impossible to know what
the claimant would choose to do without the availability of benefits. A
subjective test would unfairly punish or reward individuals with higher and
lower risk tolerances, respectively, even though they signed the same
standard contract as everyone else. Moreover, only a reasonable person test
would allow coverage decisions to apply generally. In interpreting
contracts, courts generally look to the reasonable meaning of terms. When
more than one reasonable interpretation is possible, insurance law abides
by the doctrine of contra proferentem, meaning that the reasonable
interpretation of the insured will be accepted.142 Using a test other than the
reasonable person test would allow insurers to defeat the reasonable
expectations of insureds.
Second, this test maintains the goals of disability insurance while
avoiding the perverse incentives that insurance coverage can sometimes
create. Disability insurance is meant to supply income to people when they
are unable to work without giving them an incentive not to work—that is,
minimizing moral hazard. In the disability context, the main source of
moral hazard is obvious: insureds have an incentive to stop working if they
can convince the insurer that they are disabled.
Thus, it is important that the definition of disability in a policy is broad
enough to cover situations in which people have a legitimate inability to
work, while simultaneously minimizing opportunities for people to fake
disability. It is for this reason that the reasonable person test considers the
actions of a reasonable person without disability insurance. By considering
this question, it is possible to determine if a reasonable person would be
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unable to work without the inquiry being tainted by the perverse incentives
caused by the availability of insurance benefits.143
Third, the reasonable person standard is widely used in tort and
criminal law, making the test relatively easy to apply. Though determining
the actions of a reasonable person is far from straightforward, courts should
be comfortable with the standard. The main inherent problem of a
reasonable person standard is inconsistency of application.144 Although it is
true that administrators and courts may sometimes disagree about what a
reasonable person would do in a given situation, this test provides the best
possible framework in an area of law that currently has no guiding
principle and in which a more precise standard is unworkable.
C. Qualitative–Quantitative Analysis of Future Risk
The next question is the way in which a judge or administrator should
determine whether or not a reasonable person would decide to work in the
absence of disability coverage. The crucial factor to analyze in considering
whether a risk of relapse can be a current disability is the gravity of the
risk—how likely is it that a former addict will actually relapse after
returning to work, and what are the consequences of a relapse? If a person
is unlikely to relapse and the health effects of a relapse are minor, it is safe
to say that a reasonable person would not forgo a return to work absent the
receipt of benefits. In such a case, the insured should not be considered
disabled, because it can be inferred that the person is actually able to
perform the material duties of her occupation. If the insured is claiming
benefits, it is likely that the availability of disability benefits, not a fear of
relapse, is preventing the insured from returning to work.
Conversely, when the risk of relapse is high and the possible health
effects of relapse severe, it can be convincingly argued that the risk
constitutes a current disability because it effectively prevents any
reasonable person from performing the material duties of his profession.
Courts use this type of reasoning to hold that a heightened risk of a heart
attack can constitute a current disability.145 Heart attacks can cause severe
health effects and may lead to death.146 Thus, one may assume that a person
143
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desperate person might force himself to work despite an illness that everyone agreed was totally
disabling.” Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914, 918 (7th Cir.
2003).
144
See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Supreme Court’s Search for a Definition of a Seizure: What Is
a “Seizure” of a Person Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 619,
642–45 (1990).
145
See supra notes 85–96 and accompanying text.
146
Approximately 4.7% of heart attacks are fatal. Heart Attack Victims Get Treated Faster, but
Death Rate Stays the Same, CBS NEWS (Sept. 5, 2013, 6:25 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/heartattack-victims-get-treated-faster-but-death-rate-stays-the-same/.

659

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

who faces a high risk of heart attack from a return to work would choose
not to return to work because of the health risks, regardless of the
availability of disability benefits.
This type of inquiry into the gravity of the risk of relapse is therefore
both qualitative and quantitative, including both the harm and the
likelihood of relapse. Thus far, however, courts considering coverage for a
risk of relapse have generally not considered this type of specific evidence.
Instead, they have focused on vague physician statements such as the claim
the insured “could not [return to his work as an orthopedic surgeon fulltime] without exposing himself to a high degree of risk,”147 or “is at high
risk of relapse should she return to the practice of anesthesia,”148 and an
assumption that a relapse into addiction or a heart attack would be harmful.
No court has considered quantitative evidence of the risk of relapse, which
can vary significantly among different types of addictions.149 The court in
Lasser, over a dissent, specifically found that requiring this type of
evidence would raise the bar too high for the claimant.150 Instead, the
claimant could merely provide physicians’ reports “suggest[ing] that the
risk is high,”151 ignoring the dissent’s convincing argument that “stress,
while it may affect cardiac patients, does not necessarily incapacitate them,
or prevent them from successfully returning to, and performing, stressful
jobs, i.e., Vice President Dick Cheney.”152 As the dissent correctly argues,
only if the claimant “quantif[ies] that risk [can] the ERISA decision
maker . . . determine if it constitutes a present disability.”153 Courts have
also failed to examine how harmful a relapse would actually be. While a
second heart attack could obviously be extremely harmful, the
consequences of other relapses are less clear. The negative effects of a
second paper cut or bout of the common cold are miniscule; even among
addictions, there are likely to be widely diverse consequences between a
relapse into different substances.
There are two important caveats to the qualitative–quantitative
analysis. First, the relevant measure is not the absolute risk of relapse after
returning to work. Rather, it is the relative difference in risks between a
147

Lasser, 344 F.3d at 390.
Colby II, 705 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2013).
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relapse. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
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return to work and a decision not to work: a person who has the same 60%
chance of relapse with or without a return to work cannot claim benefits
because working does not create any added risk to their health. Second,
there are some jobs for which a high risk of injury is inherent to the job,
such as a firefighter or coal miner. This risk of future injury cannot be
considered a disability because it is compensated for through increased
wages: a compensating wage differential.154 What is relevant is the
differential risk of a claimant relative to her coworkers, because that is not
compensated through wages.
The reasonable person test advocated here is, in a way, both objective
and subjective. Like the reasonable person standard common in tort law, it
is objective in that it is “based on externally verifiable phenomena, as
opposed to an individual’s perceptions, feelings, or intentions.”155 It asks, in
short, what a reasonable person would do in the insured’s situation. The
tort standard also takes into account specific characteristics of a defendant,
such as intelligence and superior skills.156 The test advocated herein goes
slightly beyond this to account for personal characteristics of the defendant,
such as history of prior relapse and a family history of addiction; this level
of subjectivity is more akin to tort law’s reasonable child standard.157 The
reasonable uninsured person test takes these individual risk factors into
account because they can significantly impact the likelihood of future
injury. Failing to account for these differences would allow coverage for
individuals with a low personal risk of future injury, and vice versa. While
considering these factors will increase administration costs somewhat, the
costs will not be large because many risk factors are easily discernible and
data about them is widely available. Moreover, the test requires
consideration of these individual factors only when they are readily
available. By accounting for these individual characteristics, the test is
somewhat subjective in that it is “based on an individual’s perceptions,
feelings, or intentions.”158 In essence, however, the test is objective because
it considers the hypothetical decision of a reasonable person, without taking
into account the insured’s own feelings regarding a return to work.
A final concern is the way in which quantitative and qualitative
evidence will be admitted into the record for an administrative decision. To
prove a disability, a claimant will need to present three types of evidence to
the extent that they are available: evidence regarding the overall likelihood
154

See Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstrom, Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work Revisited,
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of future injury in her occupation given her health status, individual and
family medical data, and evidence regarding the link between this data and
the risk of relapse stemming from a return to her occupation. In general,
claimants will simply be able to present their medical histories to the
administrator along with data regarding the risk of injury; the insurer will
likely present competing evidence.
In some circumstances, expert testimony may be required to interpret
complex or contradictory studies, as well as to detail the physical condition
of the claimant. This type of expert testimony would not be radically new
to insurance administrative decisions because currently a claimant’s and
insurer’s doctors frequently testify regarding the claimant’s health.159 These
doctors will now have to present widely available data—such as research
published in academic journals—to support their claims, rather than simply
a gut instinct about an insured’s chance of relapse. Although this could
create a “battle of the experts,” which could sometimes cause a stalemate
that a trier of fact has no reasoned way to solve,160 this problem will not be
great when there is scientific data that the administrator can use to make a
decision. Though research results can sometimes conflict, an administrator
considering conflicting studies could simply weigh them to determine what
a reasonable person would do. The flexibility of this test, which does not
set a rigid percentage cutoff for coverage, allows the administrator to
refrain from choosing between studies.
D. Policy Considerations and Categorical Bars to Coverage
To summarize thus far, a court or insurance administrator should
determine coverage for risk of future disease by analyzing whether a
reasonable person facing the risk without disability insurance would return
to work. To determine this, it is necessary to consider the quantitative risk
of relapse and the qualitative harms associated with relapse, including
individual risk factors. However, the inquiry should not end there, because
there could be other considerations that function as a categorical bar to
coverage, meaning that an entire category of claims—such as claims for
risk of substance abuse relapse—could be ineligible for coverage because
of policy concerns. As a final step, the administrator should consider
whether there are any important policy concerns that bar coverage for a
particular category of risk.
Courts often take policy considerations into account when interpreting
insurance contracts, and are especially wary of interpretations that will
create perverse incentives or lead to results that are detrimental to society.
In particular, insurance policy interpretation often takes into account the
159

See, e.g., Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381, 389–91 (3d Cir. 2003).
Andrew B. Gagen, What Is an Environmental Expert? The Impact of Daubert, Joiner, and
Kumho Tire on the Admissibility of Scientific Expert Evidence, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 401,
431 (2001).
160

662

108:639 (2014)

Future Harm as a Current Disability

concerns of moral hazard and adverse selection.161 In the context of risks of
future injury, the primary moral hazard concern, identified in Part I.B, is
that a claimant will untruthfully claim an inability to work. This concern is
alleviated by analyzing the reasonable decision of someone without
insurance. Although it is also possible that the claimant could be “faking”
the risk in itself—claiming to have a 70% chance of relapse when it is
really only 30%—this problem is solved by the use of scientific data and
doctors’ testimony as evidence.
Adverse selection—the tendency for those most at risk for a disability
to purchase disability insurance162—is another concern in insurance
coverage. Adverse selection arises when there is an information asymmetry
between the parties that leads the insurer to underestimate the insured’s risk
of future disability.163 The key moment for adverse selection is when the
insurance agreement is entered. Adverse selection can occur when the
insured is aware that she has a high likelihood of qualifying for benefits,
but the insurer is unaware of this fact.
It is unlikely that adverse selection could serve as a categorical bar to
coverage for the risk of future injury. In general, adverse selection
problems in health and disability are dealt with through underwriting—the
process by which insurers evaluate the risk of potential clients, usually by
requiring applicants to answer questions about their medical status and
history.164 If materially false statements are made in response to these
questions, benefits can be denied based on that misrepresentation.165 A
categorical bar is necessary only where information is unobtainable through
underwriting or where misrepresentation would not apply.
Other policy concerns could impact categorical bars in various ways.
Factors such as public health, the personal health of the claimant, and
coverage consistency can either make a categorical exclusion more or less
warranted. Finally, in the case of a risk of substance abuse relapse, some
courts have held that the presence of a choice in relapsing can serve as a
bar to coverage.166 This validity argument will be considered in Part III.C.167
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E. Possible Criticisms of the Reasonable Uninsured Person Test
There are two important counterarguments that could be made against
the reasonable uninsured person test. First, under ERISA, a reviewing court
must uphold a benefit denial unless it is arbitrary and capricious, or,
equivalently, unreasonable.168 Therefore, this test creates a sort of doublereasonableness problem, in which the reviewing judge must decide the
reasonableness of an administrator’s determination of a reasonable person’s
decision (regarding a return to work). How, then, is a judge to implement
the test?
Although this conjunction of reasonableness tests seems to present a
linguistic maze, the job of the judge is actually quite straightforward.
Application of the reasonable uninsured person test will proceed in the
same manner as any arbitrary and capricious review with the judge
determining whether the administrator’s decision was reasonable.169 In this
case, however, the administrator herself will also have determined how a
reasonable person would have acted in a situation. These two types of
reasonableness are slightly different. In the initial benefit decision, the
administrator will use evidence to determine what a reasonable person
would do in the claimant’s situation. The judge, on the other hand, will
look at the evidence to determine whether the administrator had a
reasonable basis for denying benefits. Even if the judge does not agree with
the administrator’s determination of the behavior of a reasonable person, he
will uphold the administrator’s determination unless the decision itself was
unreasonable. The judge’s job will be to assure that the administrator
adhered to the test, weighed the evidence in a reasonable manner, and did
not employ a categorical bar unreasonably. Although the judge’s job is
slightly complicated by the need to apply reasonableness at two levels,
federal judges are likely qualified to engage in these minor mental
gymnastics.
Second, this reasonable uninsured person test could impose large
information costs on administrators, litigants, and courts due to its focus on
scientific evidence and individual risk factors. But the evidentiary costs of
the test need not be high. Claimants would need to present only widely
available evidence regarding relapse rates and physician testimony. The
specific risk implications of an individual’s circumstances would only be
considered if there is evidence available; a lack of specialized evidence
should neither help nor hurt a claimant’s case.170 On the other hand, a
person claiming benefits for a risk of future injury would have to present
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some evidence of a heightened risk—more than the unsupported
physician’s testimony used today.
III. THE REASONABLE PERSON TEST
AND THE RISK OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE RELAPSE
A. The Science of Relapse
The risk of relapse into substance abuse is different for every
substance and for every person, hence the need for evidence that is as
individualized as possible. As an example, this Note focuses on the risk of
relapse into opioid abuse by anesthesiologists. Aside from the probability
of a relapse, the physical consequences of relapse are also a crucial variable
in determining reasonableness of not returning to work. It is also important
to look at any risk factors that may increase the likelihood of relapse; the
presence or absence of these factors may impact the reasonableness of a
claimant’s decision not to return to his occupation.
Scientific evidence shows that, in many cases, the danger of a relapse
can rise to a level that would prevent a reasonable person from returning to
work. Addictions are associated with very high relapse rates; this is the
reason that many consider addiction to be a lifelong disease that can only
be managed, not cured.171 Relapse rates are highly variable, depending on
factors such as the substance involved, physical and mental characteristics
of the abuser, and environmental factors.172 In general, relapse rates range
from 40%–60%, rates that lead many to characterize addiction as a chronic
medical illness similar to diabetes or hypertension.173
Although there are not reliable statistics regarding the general relapse
rates for users of especially potent opioids such as Fentanyl (perhaps
because abuse is relatively rare due to the difficulty in obtaining these
drugs), multiple studies demonstrate that the relapse rates for users of more
common opioids, such as heroin, are very high. One study found that
relapse rates for heroin users after release from a treatment facility were
approximately 60%, with most relapses occurring within thirty days of
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release.174 Another study of long-term outcomes found that, years after
treatment, abstinence rates were quite low.175
Many studies examine the relapse rates of anesthesiologists upon a
return to work because it is such a common problem. Of course, this will
not often be the case with other professions—there are probably no studies
examining the risk of relapse into opioid abuse by a return to work as a
plumber. A claimant would not be automatically denied benefits in such a
case—instead, the claimant would use more general evidence regarding
risk of relapse into abuse of their particular substance, the effects that a
return to full-time work may have on that risk, and any job-specific factors
that may change this risk.
One sign that a return to anesthesiology may create a high risk of
relapse is the mere fact that so many anesthesiologists become addicted in
the first place—an environment that spawns an initial addiction seems
likely to be a fertile ground for relapse as well.176 There are multiple
theories as to why anesthesiologists frequently become addicts. Factors
leading to anesthesiologist addiction are “proximity to large quantities of
highly addictive drugs, the relative ease of diverting particularly small
quantities . . . for personal use,” and a high-stress work environment.177 A
separate theory argues that small amounts of these substances can be found
in the air in an operating room, causing sensitization to the substance.178
Even if this theory does not in fact lead to initial substance abuse, it seems
logical that physical exposure to small amounts of opioids could lead to
relapse.
Studies of relapse rates among anesthesiologists returning to work
show that a return can be quite dangerous. Research findings vary, but
generally paint a pessimistic picture, making the question of “[w]hether
174
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anesthesia personnel should be allowed to return to the operating room
after successful treatment . . . highly controversial.”179 One study found that
66% of those opioid addicts reentering anesthesiology relapsed,180 and
another showed a relapse rate of 40%.181 A separate study of residents who
became addicted to opioids during their training in anesthesiology found
that only 46% of those that returned successfully reentered and completed
training in the field.182 These different results can be explained primarily by
methodological differences. Yet all of these studies suffer from the
common shortcoming of measuring only the relapse rates of those
anesthesiologists willing to return to work. It is probable that these people
only returned because they thought themselves unlikely to relapse; those
choosing not to return, conversely, probably thought that a return would
lead them to relapse. Because these studies likely considered only those
least likely to relapse, the risk of relapse of a random anesthesiologist
addict is likely to be much higher. It is probably impossible to know the
true rate of relapse; administrators will simply need to take this
methodological concern into account when interpreting study results.
Importantly, there is also evidence that the risk of relapse for those
anesthesiologists who return to work is much larger than for those who
choose not to and instead change their specialty or simply do not return to
the medical profession.183 It is this relative risk of relapse that is relevant for
the reasonableness analysis. One study showed that those returning to
anesthesiology faced a risk of relapse approximately eight times higher
than those who did not.184 Although this may in part reflect an endogeneity
problem185 caused by the fact that those most likely to relapse are less likely
to return to anesthesiology, it likely also shows a real danger in returning to
anesthesiology.
These studies also show that the qualitative physical risks of relapsing
into abuse of potent opioids are extremely high. Any relapse into addiction,
of course, leads to significant health problems. However, relapse into
potent opioid abuse is especially harmful. In one study, death was the first
179
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sign of relapse for 16% of a large group of anesthesiologists returning from
opioid addiction;186 in another study 9% of those reentering anesthesiology
died due in part to relapse.187 Obviously, even a 9% mortality rate among
returnees is extremely high, perhaps high enough to dissuade a reasonable
anesthesiologist from returning to work. Because of the high likelihood and
harm of relapse, many in the field argue that reentry should be allowed
only on a case-by-case basis after closely considering an individual’s risk
of relapse;188 others have even argued for a “one strike, you’re out” policy,
meaning that a substance abuser should never be allowed to return.189
Although the general danger of relapse is a good starting point for
analyzing whether a reasonable person would return to work, it is important
to also consider individual risk factors for relapse. Two people that worked
in the same occupation and abused the same substance may have very
different risks of relapse, depending on personal factors. The harm of a
relapse could also differ between individuals if, for example, people with a
certain gene or level of physical health are more likely to die from an
overdose. A study of anesthesiologists has shown that the major factors that
raise the risk of relapse include a family history of substance abuse and the
presence of a coexisting psychiatric disorder; the presence of these factors
together makes an opioid abuser thirteen times more likely to relapse.190
This disparity shows that individual factors are as important as general
relapse rates in determining reasonableness.
Multiple studies show that relapse rates are significantly lower when
returning anesthesiologists take part in a strict monitoring program in the
workplace that includes procedures such as random urine testing, frequent
behavioral assessment, and workplace surveillance.191 The presence or
absence of such a program at the claimant’s place of work should be taken
into account in analyzing the reasonableness of a nonreturn to work.
This scientific evidence clearly shows that the danger of a return to
anesthesiology can rise to a level that would lead a reasonable person to
refuse to return to work, even without the prospect of benefit payments. It
seems safe to say that a reasonable recovering addict would choose to
avoid a situation in which the general risk of relapse is around 50%, where
the claimant has risk factors that make her especially likely to relapse, and
where approximately 10% of those who relapse die. For those with a lesser
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risk, it will be up to first the administrator and then a judge to decide what
is reasonable in a given situation.
B. Public Policy and Substance Abuse Addiction Relapse
The final step in the reasonable uninsured person test is whether there
are policy concerns that require a categorical bar against coverage. Among
the policy issues to consider are moral hazard, adverse selection, public
health, and individual health of the claimant. This section analyzes the
category of risk of substance abuse relapse claims in light of these
concerns.
As argued in Part II.D, concerns of moral hazard and adverse selection
will rarely lead to a categorical bar in risk-of-future-injury cases.192 This is
generally true within the category of substance abuse relapse as well. On
the moral hazard side, there is a slight concern that the claimant could
fabricate a risk factor such as a family history of addiction or a psychiatric
disorder. Although the insurer will often be able to disprove such a
fabrication, the possibility of this source of moral hazard weighs slightly in
favor of a categorical bar. In terms of adverse selection, the claimant could
have failed to disclose a heightened risk of initial addiction when the
insurance policy was purchased. This creates an adverse selection problem
in regard to coverage for an initial addiction. But insurers concede that this
adverse selection issue does not create a categorical bar to coverage for
addiction, which is clearly covered under these policies.193 It is therefore
hard to argue that it should create a bar for the more remote risk of a future
relapse.
One argument against giving benefits for the risk of substance abuse
relapse is that it creates bad incentives and rewards people for their
mistakes. First, the availability of benefits for risk of substance abuse
relapse eliminates a disincentive to engage in the behavior that can lead to
an initial addiction. This is a moral hazard once removed from the
disability at issue. But again, this is primarily an argument against coverage
for addiction itself. It is unlikely that an anesthesiologist will be induced to
begin using Fentanyl because of the availability of disability benefits for
addiction; it strains credulity to believe that the availability of benefits for a
risk of relapse will impact this decision whatsoever.194
Second, some may balk at the prospect of providing benefits to former
addicts who “got themselves into this mess.” Under this argument,
coverage is unconscionable because it is “rewarding” people for their
destructive decisions. But insurance is not meant to reward anything, and
192
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benefit payments are not prizes for good behavior. Insurance is simply
meant to transfer risk so that insureds are made whole following an
unforeseen event, whether caused in part by the insured (e.g., surgery after
a car accident) or not (e.g., flood insurance). Additionally, it is nonsensical
under this argument to provide benefits for addiction but not for risk of
relapse. This argument seems to stem more from the widespread
stigmatization of addiction than from any reasoned analysis.195
There is a third argument related to the health of individual claimants
that counsels against a categorical bar. If benefits are granted to those
addicts who continue abusing a substance, but not to those who have
ceased abuse and yet are still unable to work, insureds that begin abusing
drugs have a perverse incentive to continue the abuse. Although the
Stanford court correctly pointed out that there are many other reasons for
an addict to cease abuse,196 the loss of income will still provide a marginal
disincentive to recovery. A primary goal of disability insurance is to allow
for recovery and rehabilitation; a categorical bar against coverage for risk
of relapse would undermine this goal.197
Finally, there are public health reasons for providing benefits to
anesthesiologists—and physicians in general—for a significant risk of
relapse. If denied benefits, an anesthesiologist with a high risk of relapse
may, due to financial constraints, be forced to return to practice.198 An
anesthesiologist that relapses is a significant threat to the health of patients
because their lives are in his potentially-drug-impaired hands. A substanceabusing doctor could divert medications from patients and, if working
while under the influence, could severely injure a patient or worse. One
court has explicitly weighed this public safety concern against a benefit
denial for risk of relapse.199 The threat to public safety from an
anesthesiologist’s relapse should weigh heavily in favor of providing
benefits for the risk of substance abuse relapse.
C. Does Choice Matter?
The policy considerations considered in the previous section do not
require a categorical bar against coverage, but one important consideration
remains: the idea that an addict has a choice whether or not to relapse. This
195

See Martha D. Burkett, The Burden of Stigma: Barrier to Treatment, Bane of Recovery,
87 MICH. B.J. 34, 35 (2008).
196
See Stanford v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 2008).
197
Another argument, made by the majority in Stanford, is that “[i]t would be truly perverse if [the
plaintiff] were to go on to great success in another occupation but was still able to collect insurance
checks on the basis of ‘disability.’” Id. at 359–60. This argument completely ignores the nature of ownoccupation disability insurance.
198
See supra note 143. A risk of relapse should be covered if a reasonable person without
insurance, who otherwise would choose not to return to work, would return only because of financial
necessity.
199
Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 785, 796 (W.D. Mich. 2009).

670

108:639 (2014)

Future Harm as a Current Disability

is a somewhat tricky issue. Basically, the contention made by insurers is
that the risk of relapse cannot prevent an addict from working because the
addict controls her own relapse.200 The issue comes down to causation: a
return to work cannot cause a heightened risk of relapse if the cause of
relapse is individual choice.
There are three central reasons that the choice problem should not
create a categorical bar to coverage. First, many addicts do not have a
meaningful “choice” whether or not to relapse. There are two main models
of addiction, each of which provide different insights into the degree of
choice or rational action involved in drug use by an addict.201 The first is
the disease model, which holds that addiction causes a “complete
enslavement of the will,” and that there is effectively no choice involved in
relapsing.202 This theory is supported by the fact that continuing in abuse is
seemingly irrational and extremely self-destructive.203 The model holds that
choices to ingest substances are not made rationally, and thus that addictive
behavior cannot be changed through incentives.
The other model is the economic model of addiction, which holds that
addicts do, in fact, make rational decisions.204 This model is supported by
studies showing that addicts do respond—at least slightly—to market
forces such as tax increases or criminalization.205 Economic models of
addiction are based on the assumption that as the addict begins to abuse a
substance more and more, the effects of past consumption lead even a
rational actor to enter a spiral of continued abuse;206 some also argue that
addicts are hyperbolic discounters that weigh present utility much more
heavily than future utility.207
The disease model of addiction argues that addicts truly do not have a
choice in relapsing. On the other hand, if the economic model is correct,
the picture is much less clear. Although addicts under the economic model
technically make rational choices, these choices are made under extreme
pressures that push the addict into relapse—relapse is often the rational
option.208 Furthermore, short-run incentive changes are very unlikely to
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change the rationality of a relapse,209 and moral hazard through insurance
benefits is almost nonexistent.210
Second, voluntary choice affects many illnesses—both in initiation
and maintenance—that are readily covered by disability insurance. Drug
addiction disease is not set apart from other medical illnesses by the
presence of choice.211 For example, hypertension can be caused by a
combination of salt sensitivity—a genetic factor—and individual salt use
patterns.212 Other chronic diseases such as heart disease and diabetes are
intimately related to individual choices regarding diet, exercise, and
monitoring.213 Disability policies cover these sorts of illnesses despite their
choice component;214 the (limited) choice component involved in a relapse
should not set it apart. The idea that addiction is a choice rather than a
disease similar to hypertension probably stems largely from the widespread
stigmatization of addiction in this country.215
Third, the incentive structure of insurance means that even the
presence of a true choice of future injury should not bar coverage. The
economic fear of paying benefits for risk of “chosen” future injuries comes
from the possibility that a claimant can claim to have a high risk of relapse,
which is actually much lower because the claimant can control this risk.
Yet the use of scientific data can show the actual risk; a high rate of relapse
demonstrates that the claimant is not making a false threat. Moreover, the
fact that a return to work can increase the chance of a claimant making a
harmful choice can clearly be a disability. For example, consider a
schizophrenic who, if exposed to the work environment, will engage in
self-destructive behavior. There is a choice here, yet few would argue that
schizophrenia is not a disability. Even if an anesthesiologist were able to
truly choose whether or not to relapse, the mere fact that a return to
employment would make the destructive choice much more likely should
constitute a disability.
CONCLUSION
A fall into drug addiction and dependence is a life-threatening
experience for any individual. On top of the health consequences of
209
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addiction lie equally significant financial consequences—drug addiction
often leads to a loss of employment. Thankfully for addicts, disability
insurance provides benefits to those unable to work due to addiction.
However, many insurance companies attempt to stop these payments once
the addiction has been “treated” and the active abuse has ceased, regardless
of whether the addict is able to return to work. Many courts have gone
along with this, creating a circuit split.
This Note provides a way for policy administrators and courts to
analyze insurance coverage for risk of relapse into substance abuse and for
all other risks of future injury: the reasonable uninsured person test. By
considering the likelihood of relapse and the harm associated with a
relapse, courts will be able to make coverage decisions based upon whether
a reasonable person without disability insurance would return to work in
the insured’s situation. The process is not easy on claimants because they
will have to provide scientific data (if it is available) that sheds light on
their personal risk of relapse. This test’s focus on individual risk factors
may make the test harder to administer, and may make it more difficult for
an insured to prove her case. Yet consideration of these factors will make
the test much more accurate, and claimants will not be denied benefits
simply because there is no data available. Although many claimants will be
denied coverage under this standard, those who face grave danger from a
return to employment will receive coverage.
This analysis avoids the artificial line drawing and moral judgments
that courts are currently employing in these cases. It also protects the
central goals of insurance by supplying income to those who truly cannot
work, preventing false claims by those who can, and encouraging the
rehabilitation of those with serious illnesses.
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